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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

the less, good where a substantially accurate translation had been made
to the testator before execution.5
Georgia goes farther than most states in permitting the probate of
wills of blind testators when its Supreme Court held that "it is not
indispensably necessary to the validity of a will executed by a blind
man that it should be read over to him in the presence of the subscribing
witnesses before execution. It is sufficient if he know that it is his
will."8( Arkansas places this matter before the jury, leaving it to them
whether or not the inability of the testator to read or hear read the
will is sufficient to deny probate. The Supreme Court of Arkansas says:
"When a will appears to have been legally executed, the onus of showing
fraud or undue influence therein is on the party contesting its validity,
and the circumstances that the testator could not read and did not hear
the will read at the time of the signing is a fact to be weighed by the
jury, with other circumstances, in determining whether or not he knew
its contents. ' 7 The question is discussed in L. R. A." and it is said
that the presumption that the testator knew the contents of the will
arises from the execution of it by the testator whose eyesight is so
impaired that he could not read the instrument.
From this, it can be seen that the whole trend of the courts has been
towards leniency in dealing with the wills of blind testators and all
possible benefits are granted in order that such wills may be admitted
to probate. The object of the courts seems to be to combine leniency
with protection and it can be seen readily that a judicious admixture of
these two policies is giving to the blind a knowledge and assurance that
they may rely implicitly on the courts to see that their wishes are carried
out, whether they can or cannot read or hear read, the will, and that the
fact of blindness on the part of a testator will not prove him to be
without mental capacity.
JOHN S. PALK.
Wills: Implied revocation by divorce of testator-property settlement.-In the recent case of In re McGraw's Estate, 228 Mich. 1 ; 199
N. W. 686, Mary H. McGraw, divorced wife of Howard A. McGraw,
deceased, presented for probate a will made by the deceased during
coverture, wherein she was made sole legatee. The marriage took place
in 1912, the will was executed in 1918. and an absolute divorce was

granted to her in 1921. No alimony was demanded nor received and
upwards of two years had elapsed after the decree, in which time it
could have been demanded. Proponent's dower was barred by the
statute of limitations. No express property settlement was made between the parties either before or after divorce. As the testator left
no children, the will was contested by his brother and sister. They
contended that the decree of divorce, with its attendant conditions and
circumstances, had wrought an implied revocation. The court held that
Benrud v. Anderson, 174 N. W. 617, 144 Minn. III.
Clifton V. Murray, 7 Ga. 565, 5o Am. Dec. 411.
Guthrie v. Price, 23 Ark. 407, 49 Cent. 270 & 389.
'L. R. A. I918 D. p. 747, Ross v. Ross, 147 N. W. 11o5,

NOTES AND COMMENT

there was an implied revocation of the will by virtue of the divorce
coupled with the attending circumstances.
The Michigan statute governing this matter provides that "No will
nor any part thereof shall be revoked, unless by burning, tearing,
etc. . . . Nothing contained in this section shall prevent the revocation implied by law from subsequent changes in the condition of circumstances of the testator. ' ' 2 In a former Michigan case, Lansing v.
Haynes,3 this statute was held to apply where there had been a divorce
coupled with a property settlement between the parties pending the suit.
In that case, the foundation or reason for an implied revocation by
divorce was said to be "the resonable presumption of an alteration of
the testator's mind, arising from conditions since the making of the
will, producing a change in his previous obligations and duties."' 4 The
rule as set out in the above statute is also the common law rule." Due
to the infrequency of divorces at common law, however, there were
practically no specific applications of this rule.
It has often been held, and may be considered as settled law, that a
divorce alone does not revoke a previously executed will.6 The case
in hand, at first view, would seem to directly oppose this settled doctrine.
However, the court, in deciding, was very careful to point out that
what its views might be on the bare question of a divorce was a
question unnecessary to decide at the time. The court held that the
proponent, in having allowed the statute of limitations to bar her dower
right and the doctrine of laches to bar her right to alimony, had waived
that to which she was entitled and also that for which she had neglected
to ask. The court then proceeded on the theory that, with both dower
and alimony waived, the property matters of the parties were as effectually settled as though the parties themselves had made a voluntary
case is thus brought within the holding of Lansing v.
settlement. This
7
Haynes, supra.

The common law doctrine of implied revocation (as embodied in the
C. L. 1915, Section 11825.
'Subsequent changes in the condition or circumstances of a testator which
revoke a will or a part thereof by implication, within the rule embodied in this
statute, have commonly been applied to a change in the testator's property,
in his family, or in his beneficiaries. See note to Grahm v. Burch, 28 Am. St. Rep.
339; (47 Minn. 171).
895 Mich. 168; 54 N. W. 699; 35 Am. St. Rep. 545.

"4 Kent's Comm. 521.
54 Kent's Comm. 524.
'Baacke v. Baacke, 5o Neb. x8; 69 N. W. 303; In. re Brown's Estate, 139
Iowa 219; 117 N. W. 260; Charlton v. Miller, 27 Ohio St. 298; 22 Am. Rep.
307; lone's Estate, 2II Pa. St. 364; 69 L. R. 94o; 1O7 Am. St. Rep. 581; 3 Am.
& Eng. Ann. Cas.

221,

and note; Card v. Alexander, 48 Conn. 492; 4o Am. St.
502; ng N. W. 219; 13o Am. St. Rep.

Rep. I87;Donaldson v. Hall, lo6 Minn.

621 and note.
" Will of Battis, 143 Wis. 234; 126 N. W. 9; 139 Am. St. Rep. nioi; Wirth
v. Wirth, 149 Mich. 687; 113 N. W. 3o6; Martin v. Martin, io9 Neb. 289; 19o
N. W. 872.
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Michigan statute) has not been retained in several of the states, principally because of statutory inhibition and, as in Iowa, because of judicial
construction.8
Although the statute in the instant case may have been stretched
somewhat to cover the facts of the case, the holding is in accord with
the spirit of the rule as stated in Donaldson v. Hall9 where it was said
that if accorded substance and merit, the rule "must serve the purpose
of doing by implication what the testator should have done, in justice
to those entitled to his bounty, had his attention been directly called to
the matter after the change of circumstances and before his death."
LUBIN A. PELKEY.
'In

re Bromt's Estate, 139 Iowa 219; 117 N. W. 26o; lone's Estate, 211 Pa.

St. 364; 3 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 221, and note; Charlton v. Miller, 27 Ohio St.
298; 22 Am. Rep. 307; In re Contassi, 107 Cal. 4; 40 Pac. 16.
"io6 Minn. 502; i19 N. W. 219; 13o Am. St. Rep. 621.

